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Abstract
This article reviews the significance of Jacques Rancière’s work for methodological  
debates in the social sciences, and education specifically. It explores the implications of  
framing methodology as an aesthetic endeavour, rather than as the applied technique of  
research. What is at stake in this distinction is the means by which research intervenes in  
social order and how it assumes political significance, with Rancière arguing against a  
notion of science as the other of ideology. Rancière’s argument for a democratic research  
practice organised around a ‘method of equality’ is situated in relation to openly  
ideological’ feminist ethnography. The implications of Rancière’s work for investigating  
affect in academic discourse and subjectification in education are reviewed in the  
conclusion. 
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The work of Jacques Rancière is increasingly influential in research concerned with the 
relationship between education and democracy. His delineation of two conflicting but 
interdependent ways of doing democracy – democracy as a form of governance, or as the 
stable ordering of social functions, versus democracy as an action which disrupts social 
ordering – has created an intellectual space from which to gain a new perspective on 
education’s progressive claims. Biesta (in press and in press a, 2007, 2006) draws on 
Rancière’s critique of the deliberative model of democracy to highlight the colonial logic 
at work in models of democratic education which define inclusion as a process by which 
those who are already ‘included’ reach out to those who are not and bring them into the 
existing order. In the light of Rancière’s (1987) study of the republican argument for a 
public education system, Ruitenberg (2008) re-examines the claim that democratic 
education involves teaching students about democracy or fashioning a progressive 
pedagogy which privileges students’ voices, and points to the exclusion of those treated 
as “not really speaking beings” – as people who don’t make sense - precisely, and 
perversely, because they lack the qualifying evidence of education. Citton (forthcoming) 
explores the political implications of Rancière’s challenge to the “self-evident equation 
between authority and knowledge”, and his claim that anyone – even ‘ignorant’ people – 
can teach, because anyone can govern. 
These researchers, among others (e.g. Hey 2009, Greco 2007, Nordmann 2006, Burbules 
2004i), draw on Rancière’s work to elaborate a research agenda for education which is 
not articulated primarily in terms of methods for doing pedagogy more effectively, but 
which concerns itself with how education, as institutionalised practice, orders people into 
the more and the less valuable, the more and the less significant. This ‘critical’ research 
agenda has often been framed in relation to the work of Foucault and Bourdieu. What 
Rancière’s work effects is a re-centering of this agenda around the other of power, and the 
other of domination: what he refers to, in various but equivalent terms, as politics, 
equality, democracy, and emancipation. 
Because Rancière’s argument about education as a practice has already been presented 
elsewhere, my focus in this article is on the implications of his work for research 
methodology. This is rather paradoxical, because his work is a refutation of the primacy 
given to methodology in scientific claims to truth or credibility. His argument with 
(Bourdieu’s) sociology and (Marxist) social history stems from the epistemic difference 
that these disciplines establish, and legitimate in relation to methodology, between the 
truth of their own research statements and the falseness, or ideological fantasy, they find 
in the statements of their research objects. Rancière’s point here is not to deny ideological 
fantasy, or indeed to undermine a concept of truth, but rather to question the partition by 
which two kinds of discourse - the discourse of research objects and the discourse of 
science – are differentiated from one another. This differentiation is often justified in 
relation to specialist ways of knowing, such as reflexivity, (Marxist) theory, techniques of 
research: in other words, the staples of social science methodology courses. Rancière 
challenges the notion that these practices produce a discourse which is of a different order 
to that which is their object of study: non-illusory knowledge, or knowledge which is not 
rooted in ideological fantasy. 
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Rancière here echoes some of the criticisms of ‘critical pedagogy’ – Gore (1993) for 
instance refers to ‘critical discourses’ as regimes of truth - in highlighting how ‘critique’ 
claims a position of mastery over its objects, and thereby reproduces the very hierarchy it 
criticisesii. Rancière’s attention to poetics and aesthetics – the discursive organisation of 
scientific accounts - as opposed to methodology – that which is positioned as 
before/beyond scientific accounts - is a counter to the claim there are techniques of 
knowing which enable the scientist to extricate him/herself from a position in the social 
order, and which enable him/her to overcome the ideological restrictions of that order. 
This claim, Rancière states, is precisely the means by which the scientist/science 
constitutes itself as other (i.e. not knee deep in ideology/illusion/habitus) than its object 
and as its epistemological master, since the domain of science is then cast as that which 
its object (ideological subjects) cannot know. 
Rancière’s position here is not relativistic, in the sense of all claims to knowledge being 
equally valid, or equally illusory. It is rather a defence of the possibility of politics, on the 
basis of the equality of speaking beings. Making this equality visible means undoing the 
basis on which discourses legitimate themselves as epistemologically superior to one 
another. This is the basis of Rancière’s accusation against the paradigm of social science 
– the social as science – which defines its object of study in terms of its social attributes 
(e.g. by gender, ethnicity, occupation, and so on) – or more precisely, its position in the 
social order. This order – society - is unequal, precisely because it is an ordering. By 
defining its object in terms of its social attributes, then, social science restricts its object 
of study to its social location, and effectively denies the possibility of collectivity on the 
basis of a lack of social attributes – in other words, on the basis of equality, as Rancière 
defines this. More ‘reflexive’ social science discourses, which address the problems of 
‘critical theory’ by owning up to their own location in social order, end up, from the 
perspective of Rancière’s argument, simply re-confirming its hegemony, or its lack of 
difference from itself. The problems of (Marxist) positivism are not, Rancière suggests, to 
be countered by reflecting on the sociological location of one’s own scientific discourse, 
but by challenging the equivalence established between discourse and social location in 
both the object and the subject of study – in other words, by challenging the idea that a 
statement, or discourse, is the expression of a sociological condition (i.e. of the utterer’s 
position in the social order). 
This is the second reason why an article on Rancière and methodology is paradoxical. His 
work is anti-social science, because it challenges not only the status of scientific 
knowledge of social order (the science bit), but also the descriptive capacity of its 
categories (the social bit), such as ‘woman’, ‘jewish’, ‘black’, ‘carpenter’, or ‘scientist’. 
The argument here is resonant of Butler’s (1999, 182) in Gender Trouble when she 
suggests that sociological categories (notably a feminist ‘we’) hold a constituency 
together by means of the exclusion of some part of that constituency: “the theories of 
feminist identity that elaborate predicates of colour, sexuality, ethnicity, class, and able-
bodiedness invariably close with an embarrassed etc. at the end of the list. Through this 
horizontal trajectory of adjectives, these positions strive to encompass a situated subject, 
but invariably fail to complete”. The name given to this failure – this etc. - in Butler’s 
work is supplement, or excess, and it arises due to the instability and the illimitability of 
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identity categories, including ‘I’ or ‘We’. Rancière’s endeavour can be figured as an effort 
to make such a supplement visible, without simply widening the initial identity category 
(i.e. like Butler, he would not call for feminist politics to become simply more ‘inclusive’ 
of different subject positions, such as ‘lesbian women’). Because of this, his work shares 
affinities with that of Zizek (e.g. 2005) and Lacanian and feminist theorists who explore 
the repressions and foreclosures which accompany any effort to posit identity. Rancière 
looks for such repressions in disciplinary identity – in other words, in the claims to 
specificity of a disciplinary account of the world. His focus, one could argue, is on what 
Butler, above, refers to ‘the failure to complete’, a failure Rancière makes visible by de-
differentiating social categories. As Hallward (2006, 110) states: “In general terms, 
[Rancière] has always sought to explore the various resources of displacement, 
indistinction, de-differentiation or de-qualification that are available in any given field”. 
This makes his work profoundly antithetical to a conception of methodology as an 
ordering mechanism, as that which enables the perpetuation of a discipline’s categories. 
By implication, it is also profoundly antithetical to a conception of discipline.
In being anti-social science, Rancière’s work is however also profoundly indebted to it. 
His work does not offer an alternative to social science knowledge, but rather aims to 
explore what this knowledge disavows, and how it thereby constitutes its identity. This 
makes his work significant to research practice which sees itself as feminist and 
Foucaultian, as his interest is in the labour of constituting discursive categories in the 
social science disciplines and the excess which is thereby generated. This labour is traced 
as affectively loaded: the exclusions required to sustain disciplinary identity are framed 
not simply as oversights to be corrected, but denials, repudiations – the rejection of an 
abject other. This makes his work relevant also to researchers investigating the 
relationship between body, speech and subjectification in research practice – three 
elements, which, in Rancière’s work, are always at odds with each otheriii. Rancière’s 
writing itself works as a claim to affect: it frames research as a particular kind of 
combative enterprise, to make visible what has been denied, to argue with widely used 
systems of categorisations. This makes his writing very different in tone to feminist 
accounts which foreground the uncertainty of their own claims to knowledge (Lather 
2007), a difference with conceptual implicationsiv. 
The significance of Rancière’s work for research practice is not specific to education. 
Most of this article focuses on the argument he has with social science as a paradigm. In 
doing this, I am treating education as a social science discipline, rather than as a 
discipline with specific ways of constituting its object/subject of study. However, I 
endeavour to highlight alignments between Rancière’s work and that of education 
researchers, notably feminist researchers who have been working on similar intellectual 
terrain for the last 20 years. I start by analysing how Rancière constructs research as 
democratic practice, and then go on to situate his work in relation to feminist debates 
concerned with ‘methodology as subversive resignification’ (Lather 2007). Finally, I 
examine the implications of his work both for methodological debates and for a research 
agenda in education. 
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Rancière’s critique of the social sciences: the aesthetics of knowledge versus the 
sociology of knowledge 
The word aesthetics in Rancière’s work does not refer to matters of adornment or stylistic 
embellishment. In referring to the aesthetics of knowledge (e.g. 2006), Rancière discusses 
the way in which discourses of knowledge – discourses which make a claim to know the 
world, including research accounts – constitute themselves as coherent, valid, and 
credible, in opposition to forms of ignorance. When knowledge is proffered, what form of 
ignorance is thereby produced? When social science accounts make a claim to generate 
scientific knowledge of social groups, how do they generate a category of accounts which 
are non-scientific? What role is ascribed to ignorance/non-science, and under what 
condition is ignorance/non-science transformed into knowledge? ‘Ignorance’ here is 
clearly not defined in terms of the bad thing which science fights to eradicate, but is 
instead treated as a necessary corollary of knowledge production, insofar as knowledge 
implies a certain relation to ignorance. 
To put this into more concrete terms, we can examine the two traditions of ‘critical’ 
thought which Rancière (2007, iii-xiv; 2007a) states were the occasion for him to develop 
his own work against. A central question for both traditions, as well as for Rancière’s 
work, is how can someone at a particular time and place perceive their world. One way of 
answering this is in relation to a concept of ideology, defined in Marxism as a set of false 
beliefs or, post-Althusser, as a set of practices which bring about false judgements / 
perceptions / sensibilities / actions – as in Bourdieu’s notion of practice. False here does 
not mean untrue, but that which sustains domination, or dispossession. In this figuration 
of domination, which Rancière (2007) traces from The German Ideology to Bourdieu’s 
entire corpus, people are represented as having perceptions which are determined by their 
place in society, and by their incapacity to ‘see’ (name, signify, or know) this place within 
the social order – in other words, by their ignorance of the means and fact of domination. 
Within this tradition of critical thought (e.g. Bourdieu and Passeron 1970), what school 
produces is precisely ignorance of domination and its reasons. In other words, what the 
social order produces is ignorance of how the social order really, in essence, functions. To 
make this claim means extricating oneself from that social order: extricating oneself from 
the source of ignorance. This is how Rancière reads Bourdieu’s concept of reflexivity: it 
partitions knowledge from ignorance by situating knowledge as that which is other to the 
division of labour (or in difference to the social order), and then claims ignorance as its 
object of knowledge. Rancière’s move here is to treat Bourdieu’s discourse as 
performative rather than descriptive: the ignorance (the logic of practice) which 
Bourdieu’s discourse posits exists in the first instance as a product of that discourse. In 
effect, therefore, its figuration of domination/dispossession creates a domain of 
knowledge from which the ignorant are, by definition, excluded. In other words, Rancière 
reads the modelling of ineluctable social reproduction in Bourdieu’s discourse not as a 
description of a state of affairs, but as a performative securitisation of a domain of 
knowledge. Sociological discourse can safely critique domination whilst ‘knowing’ it can 
never change, since this knowing is precisely of other people’s ignorancev. 
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The second tradition of critical thought which Rancière seeks to counter focuses not so 
much on the incorporation of domination as on the finding of a true, authentic popular 
culture, defined in terms of its autonomy from dominant values. The target of Rancière’s 
evocation of this tradition are social histories produced in the 1970s and 80s which 
conceptualised a ‘working class culture’ in terms of ‘resistance’ or ‘agency’. Celebrations 
of popular authenticity, he suggests, function as injunctions that ‘popular people’ should 
remain authentic to their own culture, and by implication, avoid becoming tainted by 
middle class ‘intellectualism’ – a move he refers to as “exclusion by homage” (p. xxiv of 
the introduction to the English edition of The Philosopher and his Poor, 2004). 
Rancière’s argument here suggests that when ‘intellectual’ readings by ‘popular people’ 
are classified as “populist ventriloquism” (David Morley in Curran et al 1996, 290), what 
is effectively claimed is the incapacity of ‘popular people’ to think ‘authentically’ (as 
popular people). ‘Popular people’ are granted their ‘own’ domain of knowledge, all the 
better to preserve the domain of ‘intellectual’ knowledge from intrusions by non-
scientists. What then is this ‘popular’ knowledge? It is defined in opposition to science: in 
other words, it is constituted by ignorance of science.   
What both traditions have in common, according to Rancière, is that they exist by virtue 
of claiming knowledge of ‘the poor’ – more specific terms could include women, 
children, workers, ethnic minorities, and so on – on the basis of ‘the poor’s’ ignorance. 
What Rancière points to is the way in which sociological knowledge emerges as the 
surplus value of the poor’s labour: it is produced by them, but is claimed by the owners of 
the means of production (social scientists). Or as Ross (1991, xviii) succinctly phrases it, 
the scientist, in both traditions, gives himself the task “of speaking for those whose 
presumed ignorance grants [him his] domain”.
This move, Rancière argues, is effected in the alignment between sensibilities 
(judgements, perceptions – ways of being) and social location. What is claimed thereby is 
that people in a social location can only ‘be’ in a way which is determined by their social 
location. This ordering, by which are established “stable relations between states of the 
body and the modes of perception and signification which correspond to them”, sets the 
scene for a dramatisation of social practices in which a certain social location coincides 
with a certain type of thought (Rancière 2006, 9). Rancière describes this construction of 
the social as the expression of a disciplinary ‘want’, a phrase which constructs disciplines 
as desiring entities: 
Before being ‘the science of society’, sociology was first historically the project of a  
reorganisation of society. […] It wanted to reconstitute the social fabric such that  
individuals and groups at a given place would have an ethos, the ways of feeling and 
thinking which correspond at once to their place and to a collective harmony. Sociology  
today has certainly distanced itself from this organicist vision of society. But it continues,  
for the benefit of science, to want what science wants for the good of society, to  
understand [savoir] the rule of correspondence between social conditions and the  
attitudes and judgements of those who belong to it.
Rancière 2006, 7 – original italics
6
What this mapping effects is a refusal of the contingency, or arbitrariness, of domination, 
because domination is figured as incorporated, and the corporeal is figured as a place in 
the social order. Consequently, and tautologically, the fact of being in a certain social 
location (e.g. being poor) becomes the reason for being in such a location, since people 
can never do anything else but ‘be’ an instance of a social location. 
Rancière’s argument is that both traditions of critical thought posit their own knowledge 
as explanations of domination. Their ‘critique’ is critical insofar as it explains the 
mechanisms of domination – it generates consciousness of domination. What is thereby 
deemed to be lacking is understanding of domination. Although both traditions owe much 
to Althusser’s (1971) reconfiguration of ideology as a practice rather than as cognitive 
‘impediment’, the logic of their discourse is that what is lacking is knowledge. This 
‘knowing’ however is itself a practice; and as a practice, it divides the world into two: 
people who are ignorant, and people who know. This is what Rancière means by the 
aesthetics of (scientific) discourse – it refers to the way in which a discourse 
performatively divides up the world into people who speak and people who merely 
ventriloquise, people who can think the social order and people who can only obey its 
logic, people who can contribute to discussions about how society should be organised 
and people who are too caught up in their own economic occupation/culture to apply 
themselves authentically to the affairs of society. ‘Knowing’ a situation of domination 
thereby quickly becomes a way of participating in it, because what is banished in this 
allocation of knowledge and ignorance is the possibility of social disorder – in the sense 
of the objects of science (the poor) doing anything else than that which has already been 
ordered by science, a science which is precisely a knowledge of domination.
Rancière’s disagreement with sociology and social history is not with the quality of their 
methodology – he does not highlight shortcomings or contradictions in how researchers 
went about collecting and analyzing data. It is rather with the presuppositions made in 
reading data, or more specifically, with the way a discipline positions its own discourse 
with respect to that of the object of study. Rancière’s work here has some affinities with 
Foucault’s archaeology in analysing the conditions under which objects become objects 
of knowledge:
A discipline, in effect, is not first of all the definition of a set of methods appropriate to a  
certain domain or a certain type of object. It is first the very constitution of this object as  
an object of thought, the demonstration of a certain idea of knowledge – in other words, a  
certain idea of the rapport between knowledge and a distribution of positions.
Rancière 2006, 6 – my italics
The specificity of a discipline is ‘demonstrated’ in the way it distributes positions – one 
might say ‘roles’ or ‘parts’ in the theatrical sense (Hallward 2006) – which distinguish 
what the objects of knowledge themselves can think and know, and the rapport this 
knowledge has with disciplinary knowledge. Rancière does not situate this distribution as 
anterior to the production of disciplinary thought but as the same as that production – it is 
in “the texture of its narration” (Rancière 2005). Disciplinary discourse therefore 
functions as a distribution of positions, and as the demonstration of the truth of this 
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distribution. This means that the construction of the object of study is not primarily 
methodological – in the sense of methodology as epistemological starting point or as 
procedure of verification. It is aesthetic, because a research-based account dramatises the 
world in a particular way.
The aesthetics of knowledge as a practice of equality
Rancière sets up two alternatives: research accounts can either explain domination – in 
other words proffer knowledge of domination as a remedy to people’s ignorance of 
domination. Or they can become ignorant of domination and offer knowledge of equality 
– this is the alternative he defends. The logic of Rancière’s argument is as follows: if 
knowledge production necessarily implies generating a type of ignorance (an ‘other’ to 
knowledge), then what needs to be ignored in order to challenge inequality? Inequality 
itself. If one is ‘ignorant’ of inequality, if one denies the reality of inequality, one is in 
effect asserting and instantiating equality. Another way of putting this is that rather than 
setting out to ‘know’ or verify inequality (or researching the perpetuation of domination), 
one can instead set out to ‘verify’ equality. 
So how does one verify equality/ignore inequality methodologically? The first step has to 
be to ‘ignore’ inequality in material circumstances. ‘Ignore’ here does not mean overlook 
or dismiss – although this is what Rancière is sometimes effectively said to do (Hewlett 
2007, Nordmann 2006) – but to treat it as not relevant in differentiating between 
knowledge and ignorance, in the senses defined above; in effect, this means that data (e.g. 
an interview transcript) should not be read as the expression of a sociological condition 
(e.g. the condition of being female in a patriarchal system), since all one will ever see is 
confirmation of inequality. Verifying equality on the hand involves starting from what is 
common to both the object and the subject of research: the production of discourse (data 
and research accounts are both discursive entities). 
The verification of equality has little to do with ‘respecting’ the words of others, trusting 
their rationality, or celebrating their existence – in other words, it is not a matter of being 
faithful to their content. It is about declassifying words, by re-ordering the way in which 
words take on meaning by virtue of the category / body to which they are assigned in the 
social order, such as the time and place of utterance, and the activity to which it is related. 
In other words, it is about reading/producing words against the guarantees, or modes of 
legitimation, offered by the social location of the speaker. One can for instance treat 
scientific statements as literary prose, ‘opinion’ as philosophy, and historical words as 
speaking in the present, in the texture of the historian’s narration. As an example of this 
move, Rancière describes his approach to writing a history of workers’ movements in 
France in the 1830s (1981) as follows: 
In principle, my workers belonged to ‘social history’. In other words, their texts were  
read as documents expressing the condition of workers, popular culture, etc. I decided to  
read them in a different way - as literary and philosophical texts. Where others were  
attempting to read about workers’ problems expressed in the language of the people, I  
saw, on the other hand, a struggle to cross the barrier between languages and worlds, to  
vindicate access to the common language and to the discourse on the community. As  
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opposed to culturalism, which sought to restore a ‘popular culture’, I valorized the 
attitude of those workers who challenged that so-called ‘popular culture’ and made an 
attempt to appropriate another’s culture (i.e. that of the ‘literate’). The idea of a ‘poetics  
of knowledge’ that would cut across all disciplines thus expresses a very close  
relationship between subject and method.
Rancière, in Guénoun and Kavanagh 2000 – my italics
The above quotation suggests two things about the practice of verifying equality – what 
Rancière refers to as ‘the poetics of knowledge’. Firstly, it figures equality as a type of 
action, rather than as the consequence of that action. The question Rancière raises here is 
what makes one’s own research practice political, or what can one do, in research 
practice, to open up the possibilities for equality? In some ways, his answer is ‘not very 
much’, insofar as all one can do is enact equality in one’s own writing. By which he 
means reconfiguring the field of knowledge to undo the partitions which divide people 
into territories of competence, or the territories by which people are assigned social 
(unequal) attributes. 
There is not ‘practical’ consequence to this theory; it is not a programme to be 
implemented by others (i.e. the revolutionary agent, ‘practitioners’, and so on). Rancière 
here distances himself from a model of political theory in which intellectuals develop 
theory for others to apply. This ‘pedagogic’ model of politics, in which the scientist tells 
people how they can be equal (to him/her), effectively, aesthetically, defers equality, by 
creating a temporal structure of delay, in which equality is put off to some point in the 
future, once critical insights have been applied. Equality thus has to be figured 
differently. Rather than a state to be worked towards, it becomes, in Rancière’s work, a 
disruption of inequality: in the quotation above, a disruption of the ways of being 
assigned to people on the basis of the division of labour. Rancière’s position here shares 
many similarities with contemporary feminist work (e.g. Butler 2007, Adkins 2004) on 
the problems of thinking equality as an unfolding liberation. I return to this below. 
The second, related point which the above quotation suggests about the practice of 
verifying equality is that it is concerned with ‘valorising’ certain actions. Those actions 
are characterised by the way they transgress the boundaries of categories: in this instance, 
the category of ‘popular culture’. ‘Valorise’ might be read in several ways here. It implies 
neglecting / ignoring data which ‘confirms’ inequality: data which states that people with 
a specific role in the division of labour have a specific way of being, or specific 
contributions to make to the social collective. However, it is not simply a question of 
dismissing such data, but reading data differently. One way of understanding Rancière’s 
point here is to compare it to Butler’s (1993) strategy of ‘valorising’ drag. Butler’s study 
of drag is not a celebration of the practice: she argues that drag can often re-inscribe 
heterosexual norms. But what drag makes sensible is the imitative nature of gender: its 
lack of ontology. Valorising drag is not a question of valorising people in drag as against 
other people, or in Rancière’s case, workers who have middle class aspirations as 
opposed to those who don’t. But it is about making prominent in one’s analytic strategy 
discursive practices which make the contingency of inequality sensiblevi.
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In order to examine what kind of account a ‘method of equality’ (Rancière 2006a) 
produces, the next section will briefly review Rancière’s most substantive ‘empirical’ 
study. I will then explore further some of the similarities between Rancière’s arguments 
and contemporary feminist debates on research methodology. 
Transforming an object into a method: discourse as mésentente versus 
méconnaisance  
One phrase keeps turning up in Rancière’s books: ‘ce que parler veut dire’ – what it 
means to speak, what speaking means. It sums up what his research is about. It is also the 
title of Bourdieu’s book, which in English is translated as Language and Symbolic Power 
(1991). Bourdieu and Rancière both set off to find the speech of the exploited, but found 
different things. Bourdieu found a state of misrecognition – in French, méconnaisance, 
literally ‘mis-knowing’. Speakers misrecognise what their statements mean because they 
do not know, or refuse to acknowledge, that what they are doing is engaging in the 
exchange of (symbolic) capital. Rancière found ‘mésentente’, which signifies through 
alliterative opposition: ‘disagreement’, rather than mis-knowing. One of Rancière’s books 
focuses on this object (1995), but it can be traced back to his study of workers’ 
movements in the 1830s. Rancière describes the research journey which led him to the 
notion of mésentente as follows:
For a long time, I looked for a ‘proper’ worker…in the corporatisation of crafts / cultures  
/ forms of originary identities. This did not work. It was impossible to see working class  
speech constructing itself from a proper body emerging from its proper location. What  
instead manifested itself was a speech which sought to drag itself away from these  
incarnations, no longer to speak like a worker but to subjectivise itself under the name of  
worker in the space of common speech…I wanted to take into account this movement  
which implied a reversal of position: grasping the other in its separation from itself, in its  
will to be the same as us, in other words, other than itself in the sense that every speaking  
being is. 
Rancière 2005
‘Grasping the other in its separation from itself’ – what does that look like in practice? In 
The Nights of Labour: archives of the proletarian dream (1981), Rancière examines what 
workers did at night, in their ‘free’ (because unproductive) time - in that time which 
suspended the cycle of work and rest. The book takes us through poems composed by 
metal workers, letters written by builders who dream of being artists, interior décors 
which aspire to a bourgeois aesthetic, newspapers written by carpenters in which they 
represent their work to themselves and respond to the images of work by others - such as 
Gauny, a carpenter, who writes: “Ah! Old Dante, you have not travelled in the real Hell, 
in the Hell without poetry, adieu…” (29). 
This ‘time of day’ – not sleep, not work - is treated as a moment when workers spoke in 
ways which exceeded any coincidence with themselves as occupants of a specific social 
place, or doers of an economic practice. Rancière’s argument is that the workers whose 
lives he examines aspired, in this time, to be something other than what they were, to 
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make ‘useless’ non-functional things, to escape the workshop’s boredom and discipline, 
the stupid productivity of servitude, and the injunctions of older workers to take pride in 
their craft. In other words, to have the forms of time (leisure) and forms of being (non-
worker) of the other. They behaved as if they had this leisure at their disposal, as if they 
were equal to those who did not work. The term ‘worker’ here does not designate 
particular individuals, an identity category, but an instance of subjectivation: “‘Worker’, 
or better still ‘proletarian’ is…the subject which exists as a measure of the gap between 
the part played by work as a social function and the absence of a part [in the sense of both 
‘share’ and ‘role’] in the definition of what is common to the community by those who 
carry out this work” (Rancière 1995, 60).
What is ‘valorised’ in this account then is not an external object doing/being politics; 
‘empirical’ workers are not shown to be moving towards particular progressive goals. The 
workers are not illustrated as ‘resisting’ or exercising ‘agency’; neither are they displayed 
as victims, as exemplars of misery (c.f. Bourdieu 2003). What is made sensible is the 
equality of workers as a part of society (rather than as individuals), because they are 
doing something else than their social identity. This doing is a claim, a rendering sensible 
of commonality.  Equality here is not something with a substantive content; it is not a 
theme in their/the writing. Rather, it is the performative enactment of a lack of a specific 
identity, a lack which is delineated in the blurring of a distinction between data and 
commentary: “If we are unable to differentiate systematically Rancière’s working 
assumptions from Gauny’s [a carpenter featured in the book], if we fail to disentangle 
‘objective’ narration from free indirect discourse, this reflects the book’s commitment to 
an equality legible even in the form of its Darstellung [narration]” (Parker 2004, xiii).  
The untangling of words from their social places is achieved in part by taking issue with 
more conventional social histories and what they fail to symbolise. The construction of 
this time of day as an object of study is designed to counter the assumption that workers 
are productive in terms of their work only – in other words, produce nothing except their 
own occupational particularity. Against the anticipated criticism that this time, and its 
workers, are not representative, Rancière argues that he does not seek to destroy the 
images of work and workers generated in more statistically-based social histories, but to 
multiply the images of workers – and to evoke images which suggest that workers have 
something else to contribute to communal life, or society, than their labour, whilst not 
thereby losing their identity as workers, as individuals confronting the social order. 
This is what is at issue in the concept of mésentente, or disagreement. Whereas 
misrecognition posits the epistemological and ethical value of science as its 
countervailing force, disagreement insists on the disputed status of speech. To sustain this 
claim, Rancière fragments the concept of speech into two: there is speech in its positivity, 
and there is the outside of speech, that which is not heard as speech, but rather as noise, 
or as ventriloquism. Cases of disagreement are those where there is a lack of agreement 
not only about the object of debate (what constitutes audible speech in the study of 
workers) but also the status of the speakers themselves, as speakers who speak, rather 
than emit noise or ventriloquise.  
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Situating the method of equality - Does Rancière share his method with that of 
feminist 'science'?
The debates which Rancière holds with sociology and social history over how to treat the 
speech of the researched are reminiscent of those which have animated feminist research, 
particularly ethnography, in the last 20 years. The question revolves around how ‘openly 
ideological’ research represents the other (Lather 2007). How does one tell the lives of 
others whilst not standing in for them? How does one go about removing oneself from a 
position of mastery in conveying “subaltern ways of knowing” (Lather 2007, 37) whilst 
simultaneously retaining a notion of science / research? How does one address the 
question of the status of the object after the concept of knowledge / power? 
In exploring the methodological debates sustained by concerns about how to represent the 
ways of knowing of those traditionally excluded from legitimate knowledge – in other 
words, those deemed to have knowledge of only particular (not common) value – Lather 
emphasises the necessity of developing a ‘doubled science’: ‘[New feminist ethnography] 
calls for a doubled epistemology where the text becomes a site of the failures of 
representation and where textual experiments are not so much about solving the crisis of 
representation as about troubling the very claims to represent” (37). This conception of 
science counters the view that a distinction between subject and object is necessary to 
produce a ‘critical’ research account (Adkins 2004). It also questions the ethics of 
speaking with or for the ‘voiceless’ on the basis of a presumed self-identity of (other 
people’s) lived experience. As Lather notes, this turn in ethnography has led to greater 
emphasis being placed on issues of textuality and disciplinary history, as well as on more 
personal or intimate data sources, including diaries, journals, and dialogic interview 
formats. The aim has been to find a way of writing which is less exploitative, whilst not 
eradicating from view the power imbalances of research situations. Lather describes her 
own work in terms of realising “a dream of science outside of mastery and transparency” 
(42), a line which Rancière might have written about his own body of work. 
Although Lather and Rancière share many concerns about the practice of research, the 
differences in the tone of their writing are telling, and consequential. The landscape of 
research which Lather evokes is one of “ruins” (2007, 40), “aporetic suspension” and 
“constitutive unknowingness”, in which roam ‘partial’ truths of questionable legitimacy, 
disrupted claims, and “ethical practices[s] of undecidability” (2006, p 4-5): “my interest 
is in practices that enact a stammering relationship towards the incompletely thinkable 
conditions and potential of given arrangements” (2007, 43). 
There is no trace of a stammer in Rancière’s prose. He certainly depicts a partial truth, but 
partial in the sense of partisan, not castrated. 
To establish what is at issue in this stammering and its absence, it is helpful to draw an 
analogy with Hey’s (2006, 2008) exploration of academic melancholia. Hey uses Freud’s 
concept of melancholia to analyse the methodological commentaries of feminist 
academics who construct their research object in reference to their own working class 
origins: “we are beginning to speak of our histories…and expose the terrifying 
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fraudulence of our subjugation” (Walkerdine 1985, quoted in Hey 2006, 297). Although 
the idea of grounding research in personal experience has been put into question by the 
poststructuralist conception of the subject, the ‘passionate attachment’vii to the 
autobiography of a research question remains, Hey suggests: “I conceptualise them 
[expositions of class anger and origin in feminist work] as a defensive aggressive 
melancholic feminist formation expressing personal and political attachments to that 
which has been lost” ( 300). Lather’s evocation of a research landscape in ruins seems to 
betray a similar attachment to that which has been lost. This is not expressed in relation to 
class as a sensible, collective experience, but rather in relation to the project of science in 
bearing witness to the lives of marginalised others: “what does it mean to see these 
women as data, as victims, as AIDS patients […] Personally, it is a chance to get myself 
into a situation where I cannot use my poststructuralist affiliations to undermine 
emancipatory intentions and practices” (Lather 2007, 50). It appears to be this tension 
between emancipatory desires and poststructuralist suspicions that leads Lather to 
articulate such hybrid concepts as ‘partial knowledge’ and fraught ambitions such as 
“grasp[ing] the limits and possibilities of our grasp” on research objects (42 – my italics).
Rancière does not appear affected by ‘scientific’ melancholia – one way of interpreting 
the conceptualisation of a ‘doubled science’. His argument that disciplinary thought 
offers the possibility of altering the distribution of the sensible – of what can be heard and 
seen – gives research a heroic allure. As Citton (Forthcoming a) suggests, Rancière’s 
theatrical conception of political agency, in which academic writing can instantiate 
equality by re-constituting the world, grants (academic) writing the kind of political 
significance which has been put into doubt by both poststructuralism and ‘evidence-
based’ policy: “we like it whenever someone suggests that we can be ‘subversive’ by 
simply sitting there with our eyes open”. Although Rancière’s writing lacks the self-doubt 
that might open up a space for examining the effect of verifying equality beyond the text, 
the differences with Lather’s approach are also suggestive of the way in which desires for 
emancipation and theoretical consistency in ‘openly ideological’ poststructuralist research 
can become sublimated in somewhat contradictory cognitive ideals; Lather (2007, 42) for 
instance maintains that she is “try[ing] to understand” the world, in contrast to Rancière’s 
(1987) blunt argument that there is nothing to understand, there are only things to be said 
about the world. One could argue that it is precisely the endeavour to understand the 
world that makes for a ‘ruined’ research practice.
There are thus many similarities between Rancière’s methodological concerns and those 
of contemporary feminist ethnography, although Hey’s conception of melancholia teases 
out the implications of differences in poetics, and helps to clarify Rancière’s (2004) 
disagreement with the ‘pathos of the impossible’ in some strands of postmodernismviii. 
Affect as an object of study
Hey deploys the concept of melancholia to investigate the affective investments in 
sociological research, which feature prominently in feminist methodological thinking, 
including Lather’s. This again is a concern Rancière’s aesthetics of knowledge shares 
with feminist ‘science’. Rancière’s notion of a poetics of writing foregrounds the 
affective dimension of accounts. His argument that research is ‘a distribution of sensible’ 
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seems to be a re-working of Foucault’s notion of discursive regimes, with affect treated in 
terms of its relation to subjectification, rather than as a genetic property of the body 
(Potte-Bonneville 2005). The significance of this conceptualisation of affect can perhaps 
best be seen in the way Rancière challenges Bourdieu’s conceptual framework. 
Rancière insists on the desires which Bourdieu's discourse articulates - what it wants. 
When Bourdieu’s Distinction (1979) states that people of different classes have different 
aesthetics tastes – different ways of feeling –, and that working class people do 
not/cannot appreciate the music of Schubert, what Rancière (2007, 1984) reads is a re-
articulation of the perennial concern of elites to protect a language and a culture from the 
attention of those without distinction. This argument is based on asking: who benefits 
from the narration of a ‘story’ in which poor people cannot understand the beauty of fine 
art or non-realist drama, since it is beyond their reach in terms of cultural capital? 
Precisely The Inheritors (Bourdieu 1964). If Bourdieu’s books satisfy this rich clientele, 
on what basis is a depiction of a rigorously classed habitus persuasive? Rancière answers: 
on the arousal of disgust. The persuasive power of Distinction, in this account, is that it 
forces its privileged readers to contemplate the fascinating horror of popular culture, of a 
lumpen proletariat unable to do anything else except reproduce. ‘The empirical’ in 
Bourdieu’s social world, Rancière concludes, is nothing but flesh given to the Platonic 
fantasy that those who work cannot ‘feel’ in the same way as those whose social role is to 
think.   
Rancière’s critique opens a chasm between Bourdieu’s intolerance of hierarchy and the 
aesthetics of his discourse. This is made possible by treating disciplinary theory as the 
expression of disciplinary ‘wants’ rather than as a model of the world - in other words, as 
structured by fantasy. 
Rancière stresses that his work is not a theory of individual psyche (2007a); the fantasies 
he explores operate at the level of discourse. His argument seems to echo Hey’s in 
treating ‘passionate attachments’ to visions of class identity in terms of a ‘defensive 
aggressive formation expressing personal and political attachments to that which has 
been lost’, although Rancière is less generous than Hey in identifying such a formation 
also as the occupation of disciplinary territory. In both the work of Hey and Rancière, 
however, the aim is not to get away from fantasy in academic writing, but to structure it 
in more egalitarian ways.  
Mésentente, methodology and education research
How might one interpret the significance of Rancière’s work for research practice in 
education? It might be best to start with what Rancière’s work does not help achieve. His 
books are not prescriptions in how to make research practice more ‘effective’, reflexive, 
literary or political. In treating ‘empirical’ research as fictional, as the demonstration of 
fantasy, Rancière challenges claims that social science research can reveal a given 
situation which lies elsewhere than in its own materialisation, as discourse. More 
significantly, his work also problematises constructivist epistemologies which suggest 
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that, through reflexivity, at least ‘partial truths’ or Lyotardian ‘small narratives’ can be 
produced. These make frequent appearances in ethnographic accounts in education. 
Rancière claims his own research as unequivocally true, fictional and structured by the 
political fantasy of equality. For this claim to make sense means configuring the 
relationship between these terms in such a way that they do not mutually exclude each 
other. How is this to be done? Many of Rancière’s books can be read as genealogies of 
research objects prominent in the social sciences: the poor (2007), the image (2003), the 
school (1987), the unconscious (2001). Genealogies fuse ‘truth’ and ‘fiction’ by 
demonstrating the way in which truth emerges within historical ‘regimes’ of thought. The 
genealogy as a method / object of research appears differently than in the work of 
Foucault, however, because of Rancière’s displacement of the presupposed ‘historical’ 
time difference between the discourse of the past (the ‘data’ of genealogies) and the 
discourse of the present (the writing of genealogies). Rancière’s genealogies trace/are 
moments of enacted equality in the construction of research objects. They are not 
‘reconstitutions’ or historical descriptions of such moments, as in Foucault’s early work, 
but interventions in contemporary scientific debates which intervene precisely by 
collapsing the apparent oppositions in such debates – in other words, by creating a 
situation of mésentente. 
Rancière’s (1987) genealogy of the school as an object of thought is an example of this. 
Written at a time when the recently elected French Socialist government looked to 
education researchers for ways of creating a more egalitarian school system, the book 
positioned the two options under debate – a standards-based republican universalist 
curriculum and a pedagogically and culturally ‘inclusive’ curriculum – as rationalisations 
of inequality, both (Ross 1991). This positioning was achieved through the telling of the 
story of Jacotot, a 19th century revolutionary lecturer whose claim ‘all intelligences are 
equal’ made visible the contempt for ‘the People’ effected in the institutionalisation of 
education and its ordering of unequal capacities.
Rancière’s genealogy of the unconscious (2001) could be read in a similar way, in 
highlighting the fusion of truth, fiction and fantasy in the creation of a new science. The 
study starts by arguing against critiques of Freud’s work which focus on the 
reductiveness of his interpretations and dubious claims to evidence. The Freudian 
unconscious, Rancière demonstrates, turns a literary ‘truth’ into a scientific one, by 
recruiting literary works in the defence of the claim that fantasy has significance – that it 
constitutes a kind of knowledge, and is not mere ignorance / false beliefsix. This is what 
Freud finds in the story of Oedipus. Its centrality in Freud’s work is not because of the 
sex: there are several Greek myths featuring incestuous couples who do not suffer for it 
(e.g. Zeus and Hera). What is significant in Oedipus is that he does not know he is 
committing incest; it is learning of his situation that afflicts him. What Freud finds in 
Oedipus, then, is a model of knowledge as affect, in which it is knowing a situation – 
rather than the substantive content of that situation – which is traumatic. It is Freud’s 
invention of the death drive which transforms this logic into a common condition, as 
opposed to the trace of childhood trauma. Through this genealogy, Rancière constructs an 
image of the unconscious as a statement of equality - in stark contrast to its common 
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figuring in the social sciences as an esoteric / particular object, of questionable ethical 
value, whose study / statement of existence functions to secure epistemic mastery over 
research participants. This account also gives rise to two ways of demonstrating equality: 
“equality as a capacity to be verified by anybody” - equality as the indeterminate signifier 
figured in The Nights of Labour; and equality as the “indifferentiation of a collective 
speech, a great anonymous voice” (2004, 203), a description which invites comparison 
with Lacan’s Real. Rancière’s genealogy here is not simply ‘about’ Freud – it is also 
about how fantasy can be thought as knowledge, and thus as endemic to research, rather 
than as the opposite of ‘reality’; and also how fantasy becomes politically salient. The 
book is as much about demonstrating what is at stake in contemporary (scientific) 
research as it is about Freud. 
So where does this leave social science methodology? Rancière’s argument does not 
weaken the claims of science, but it does give science a different status. Rather than being 
the means to translate the properties of the object of research, methodology becomes 
about building a stage and sustaining a spectacle (Hallward 2006); it constitutes an act, a 
way of configuring and dividing the domain of the sensible. Scientific statements produce 
effects: “they draft maps of the visible, trajectories between the visible and the sayable, 
relationships between modes of being, modes of saying, and modes of doing and making” 
(Rancière 2004, 39). This argument widens the role of research ethics beyond sections in 
methodology chapters, to embrace the poetics of academic discourse and how they 
performatively constitute the worldx. This is suggestive of the way in which ethnographic 
accounts can, without apology, reject positivistically inflected conceptions of 
methodology – if science is thought of as constituting the world rather than understanding 
it, the problem of how to account for a ‘ruined’ research practice, or ‘partial’ truths, is 
removed. This is not to say that writing research becomes less problematic, less difficult 
affectively, or simply fiction. Indeed, Rancière suggests that the difficulty of reflexivity is 
not so much related to how one can account for one’s position in the social, but rather 
with the labour of articulating one’s fantasies, or the fantasies of one’s disciplinary 
identity and the ‘wants’ satisfied in return for producing knowledge. These fantasies are 
rendered in the way one’s own claim to knowledge posits its other: the ignorance to 
which it replies. 
In education, research funding is often predicated on knowledge of inequality, and 
ignorance of how to reduce it. This knowledge of inequality underpins programmes 
focused on developing methods for helping those who are falling behind, establishing a 
curriculum which allows students to fulfil their personalised potential, finding more 
accurate ways of classifying people by ability so as to develop strategies to counter 
exclusion. Rancière’s work is an argument against these problematics.
Researching subjectification in education
In addition to forcing a reconsideration of the status of social science, Rancière’s work is 
highly significant to theorising and investigating subjectification. To date, the research of 
identity in education has been extensively informed by the notion of habitus, particularly 
in terms of the relationship between students’ background, projected futures and their 
discursive acts in school. The argument for a more situated, embodied conception of 
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literacy for instance has recruited Bourdieu’s framework to show that there is no 
universally valued form of linguistic competence (e.g. Carrington and Luke 1997). 
Rancière’s conception of mésentente does not argue with this diagnostic, but it does offer 
a very different research agenda in response to the situation, and perhaps a more hopeful 
one than the mournful tracing of an inescapable symbolic violence. Not hopeful in the 
sense of anticipating a better future, but because exuberantly anarchic. It opens up 
possibilities for researching subjectification as the disruption of, and to disrupt, categories 
in educational practice, for instance the classification of vocational and academic speech / 
students, ‘gifted and talented’ and ‘special needs’ speech / students, ‘satisfactory’ and 
‘excellent’ teaching / teachers. This is not to deny the parasitic nature of the endeavour, or 
the implausibility of winning research grants on the basis of this kind of rationale. But it 
does open possibilities for researching education in terms that are not predicated either on 
an ethic of increasing effectiveness or of hermeneutic suspicion.
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i I am very grateful to researchers who have helped me, through discussions, draft papers and e-mail 
exchanges, experiment with Rancière’s ideas, including Gert Biesta, Yves Citton, Peter Hallward, 
Valerie Hey, Claudia Lapping, Martin Oliver, Nick Peim, Paul Stirner and Michael Young.
ii What is at stake here is the performativity of scientific accounts, and how they may enact mastery 
over ‘dominated’ subjects even whilst criticizing domination. The concept of performativity develops 
the argument that power and authority work in part through discourse, by bringing a situation into 
being. If an account divides people into the ‘dominated’ and the ‘dominating’, it could be said to enact 
performatively a social categorization by which the ‘dominated’ can do nothing else except be 
dominated. This account could consequently be said to re-inscribe hierarchy, and to assume a position 
of mastery over ‘the dominated’. The idea that research accounts are performative thus points to the 
power of accounts to materialize – to bring into being - what they represent, and thus to re-inscribe 
hierarchy and domination, or to question their basis by pointing to the lack of foundation for 
domination. 
iii In this respect, Rancière’s work can be aligned with work focusing on the ‘decentred’ subject, 
following in the wake of the work of Foucault on the construction of the subject and the influence of 
the ‘linguistic turn’ in Lacan and Derrida – see Hall 1992 for an overview of this move towards a 
decentred vision of the subject. One of the characteristics of Lacanian-influenced work is the emphasis 
on a supplement generated from the discursive constitution of the subject: an unsignified/unnameable 
remnant which cannot be included within an identity category, but which secures the boundaries of that 
category. This is where Rancière’s work is resonant of Lacanian work, because both point to a 
dislocation between a body and its symbolization within a discursive regime, a dislocation brought 
about by a supplement which remains unaccounted for (which remains unsymbolised). This is why 
Rancière’s work is also resonant of feminist theory which emphasizes that the conflation of ‘gender’ 
with male/female, masculine/feminine dichotomies posits gay and lesbian bodies as ‘supplementary’ – 
in excess of, and not accounted for within feminist politics (Butler 2004). Butler has also pointed to the 
dislocation between a body, a system of symbolization, and a performative claim to subjectivity.
iv One way of interpreting this difference is in relation to Rancière’s own research history. He started 
off writing alongside Althusser on the development of a Marxist ‘science’, contributing a chapter to 
Lire le Capital (Reading Capital) in 1965. After rejecting the Althusserian distinction between science 
and ideology, he co-wrote La Parole Ouvrière (which translates as ‘Workers’ speech’) in 1976, in an 
endeavour to find the ‘authentic’ voice of a pre-Marxist workers’ movement. His subsequent writings 
can be construed as a rejection of his own earlier work, and the traditions to which they belonged. 
v See Pelletier (2009) for a fuller account of Rancière’s critique of Bourdieu. Rancière’s develops his 
critique most fully in the penultimate chapter of The Philosopher and his Poor (2007).  
vi Rancière argues that a research account effects ‘a division of the sensible’, by which he means the 
system of distribution according to which ‘the common’ – a term which in English covers a range of 
concepts including the common good, the public realm, the community, the universal – is divided into 
particular parts (the private, the domain of exclusive expert knowledge): “I call the distribution of the 
sensible the system of self-evident facts of sense perception that simultaneously discloses the existence 
of something in common and the delimitations that define the respective parts and positions within it. A 
distribution of the sensible therefore establishes at one and the same time something common that is 
shared and exclusive parts. This apportionment of parts and positions is based on a distribution of 
spaces, times, and forms of activity that determine the very manner in which something in common 
lends itself to participation and in what way various individuals have a part in this distribution”. (2004, 
12). Valorizing the attitude of workers who challenge a certain idea of ‘popular culture’ is an endeavour 
to ‘re-distribute the sensible’, by demonstrating that workers do not have ‘their own’ culture. The claim 
that workers have their own particular culture is a move, Rancière argues, of excluding them from the 
realm of the common – i.e. exclusion by homage. Rancière’s argument here is not that there is a 
substantive thing called ‘common culture’, but that the partitioning off of ‘popular culture’ to which are 
assigned particular bodies implies either that there is another realm of culture which is precisely not 
associated with particular bodies (universal culture – we might refer to this as the Leavisite argument), 
or that is there is no realm of common/equal culture (Bourdieu’s argument). Rancière’s theoretical 
enterprise is an endeavour to avoid these two alternatives. Butler’s representation of drag practices 
could be viewed in a similar way. In her work, drag makes apparent that there is no authentic, 
ontologically-indexed way of being gendered; and that there is no distinct ‘queer culture’, defined in 
terms of a ‘particular’ (unique to queer bodies) set of practices. This is because she figures drag as 
imitative, as performative.
vii Hey draws on Butler’s concept of ‘passionate attachment’, as developed in the latter’s examination 
of theories of subjection (Butler 1997a).
viii In particular, Rancière distinguishes his notion of mésentente from Lyotard’s concept of differend.
ix Zizek (1989) develops a similar argument in Chapter 1 of The Sublime object of Ideology, in which 
he explores the argument, put forward by Lacan, that Marx developed the idea of the symptom in 
Freud’s work: what Marx showed is that aberrations in the capitalist system (depressions, market 
crashes and so on) were not just epiphenomena to be rectified, but the key to understanding the 
functioning of the whole system. In other words, what were previously ‘insignificant’ processes were 
transformed into knowledge of capitalism. Freud then used the same procedure with respect to dreams 
and slips of the tongue – also previously seen as epiphenomena - to generate knowledge of human 
psychology.
x For a recent, wide-ranging examination of the implications of performativity for social science 
research methodology, see Law (2004).
